The Developmental Consequences of Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: The Performance of Foreign Owned Firms in Hungary by King, Lawrence Peter
The Developmental Consequences of Foreign Direct
Investment in the Transition from Socialism to
Capitalism: The Performance of Foreign Owned Firms in
Hungary
By: Lawrence Peter King
Working Paper Number 277
September 1999The Developmental Consequences of Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition from
Socialism to Capitalism: The Performance of Foreign Owned Firms in Hungary
1
Lawrence Peter King
Yale University
September 30, 1999
Word Count: 11,846
                                                          
1 I would like to thank the Social Science Research Council at Yale, the Yale center for
International and Area Studies Program, the Yale Center for Russian and Eastern
European Affairs, and a Mellon "Triple-Transition" fellowship for supporting this
research.  I would also like to thank István János Tóth, Matild Sági and Imre Kovacs for
various data sets and code-books. Jószef Tóth, Gabriella Tóth, and Balázs Váradi
provided invaluable contributions as research assistants.  Finally, I would like to thank
Caleb Southworth, Debra Minkoff and Dalton Conley for their valuable suggestions and
comments on various drafts of this paper.1
The Developmental Consequences of Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition from
Socialism to Capitalism: The Performance of Foreign Owned Firms in Hungary
Abstract: This article examines the debate between Neoliberals and Modernization
theorists on the one hand and dependency and world systems theorists on the other about
the developmental impact of foreign direct investment in post-communist society. I test
six hypotheses derived from this debate with logistic regression on a 1996 large-n random
sample survey of Hungarian firms to see if foreign owned firms perform better than their
private domestic counterparts.  I then supplement these findings with three more logistic
regression models of performance tested on a 1997 large-n, random sample survey of
Hungarian firms.   Foreign owned firms are found to have superior performance to
domestically owned private firms on 6 of these indicators. Furthermore, while foreign
owned firms create less demand for local producers than domestically owned firms, this
is not at a level which is statistically significant. These findings support the
neoliberal/modernizationist position that foreign investment creates high performing
firms – which advocates claim are capable of driving the modernization of the entire post-
communist economy.
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, development, performance, Hungary, transition,
       socialism, capitalism.2
Few subjects produce such heated theoretical conflicts and polemics as the long
running debate on the impact of the contact of the advanced economies of the West with
the less developed regions of the world.  On one side stands the modernization school,
dominant in comparative social science in the 1950s and 1960s (see Rostow 1960;
McClelland 1964; Apter 1965; Lewis 1948), allied with the now dominant neoclassical
development economics (see Sachs 1991; Sachs and Lipton 1991; Fischer and Gelb1991;
Blanchard et al. 1993; Aslund 1995; Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994).  Various members
of the dependency and world systems schools, which blossomed during the Vietnam War,
fiercely contest the claims of these scholars. 
 Contact with the West and foreign direct
investment (FDI) in particular, serves only to enrich the West and further "underdevelop"
the poorer economies (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1979; Amin 1974; Galtung 1971;
Cardoso & Faletto 1979; Borschier & Chase-Dunn 1985; Landsburg 1979; O’Hearn
1989).
The arguments advanced in the debate between these two camps, which largely
focussed on the experience of the "Third World," have resurfaced in the discussion on
how best to achieve a successful transition from a planned to a market economy in the
post-socialist world. 
 While there are very few today who question whether exchange
itself produces underdevelopment, strong opposition to foreign investment still exists,
especially within the political field of most less developed and industrial latecomer3
countries.  Even in Hungary, a country which is very solicitous of foreign investment, the
dependency/world system perspective is well represented in the political field.  For
example, a member of the center right party Fidesz – which won the 1998 election –
criticized foreign investment on the grounds that “[T]he Hungarian economy is not
organically connected with these new large foreign enterprises:  what Hungary provides
them with is not much more than space, some infrastructure, and none-too-skilled labor.
Besides, the large portion of imported goods in the inputs of these foreign-owned
companies is one of the reasons for our negative balance of trade.” (Records of
Parliament, No. 217, Oct. 30, 1996, p.26003 – translation by Balás Varádi)  A growing
list of social scientists also apply the concepts developed in the dependency and world
systems theory to question the developmental virtues of foreign investment in societies in
transition from socialism to capitalism (Bakos 1995; Gowan 1995; Ellingstad 1997;
Matzner 1996; Bailey, Sugden and Thomas 1998; Andors and Summers 1998).
The centerpiece of the neoliberal claim is that foreign direct investment can
provide crucial help in modernizing the industrial order of the post-communist
economies.  Foreign direct investment via privatization would recreate socialist era
property in its own, advanced capitalist, image.  Gone would be the lumbering and
inefficient (not to mention doomed to extinction) “dinosaurs.”  They would be
transformed into fast, relentless, fearsome, internationally competitive “sharks.”  These
dynamic firms, introduced into post-communist waters through privatizations and
greenfield investments, could provide much of the motor for economic growth in the
post-communist economy.  Indeed, foreign direct investment was the U.S.4
administration’s answer to why there was no Marshall plan for post-communist Eastern
Europe.
2  The dependency theory/world systems theory countercharge is that foreign
investment leads to the transfer of economic control and wealth to foreign powers,
ultimately leading to economic stagnation.
Advocates argue that foreign direct investment provides a vast array of benefits to
recipient firms and economies.  First, FDI brings crucial Western knowledge and values
in the form of superior Western management techniques, business ethics, entrepreneurial
attitudes, labor intensity and production techniques.  Second, FDI makes possible
industrial upgrading by tying firms into global research and development networks and
thus technology transfer as well as by providing a great deal of investment capital. Third,
FDI makes possible the growth of enterprises by providing access to crucial Western
markets.  This growth, in turn, provides a source of new jobs and stimulates demand for
inputs from domestic suppliers. Fourth, FDI introduces new market entrants that reduces
the monopolization of the recipient economy (For Eastern Europe see Sachs 1993: 3;
Sachs 1995; Svetlicic, Artisien and Rojec 1993:10; Dunning 1993:30; Hamar 1994: 188;
Mann 1991: 184; Zloch-Christy, 1995: 1; Csaki 1995:108; Faur 1993:204; EBRD 1995;
Radice 1993; Cantwell 1994; Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994; Dobosiewicz 1992;
Kozminiski 1993: 35).  Many of these arguments closely mirror the imagery and logic of
earlier modernization theories.  For example, Dobosiewicz suggests "Foreign investment
and the operation of foreign enterprises can be likened to a battering-ram beating down
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many obstacles to the introduction of a free- market economy that for over forty years the
old system has chosen to ignore" (1992: xii).
In stark contrast to this assessment, the dependency/world systems advocates see
foreign investment as the advance guard of a new economic imperialism.  Foreign
investment results in “disarticulated” development.  Because of foreign ownership, the
normal linkages that would develop with domestic business do not occur, and profits are
exported out of the country. As a result, the gap grows between the recipient of foreign
investment and the country from in which the Multination Corporation (MNC) is based
and originated.  This analysis has been applied to foreign investment in Eastern Europe
by a growing number of authors.  Ellingstad (1997) argues that foreign investment in
Hungary is analogous to foreign investments in the Mexican Maquiladora  system, and
thus promotes “low-wage, low or medium skill, low value added manufacturing, with
little hope for a meaningful upgrading of skills” (p.9; see also Andor and Summers 1998).
Another line of critique rests in the destruction of domestic production networks by
foreign investment. Matzner (1996) refers to this as “market-destroying” behavior which
occurs when a foreign firm buys a domestic company, destroys local production, and sells
output produced elsewhere on the domestic market. Bakos (1995: 102) adds that foreign
investment exhibits a strong tendency to recreate and reinforce monopolies. Both of these
positions are consistent with Inzlet’s (1994) and Bailey’s (1995) claims that  foreign
owned firms cut R & D expenditures.
Hypotheses6
I derive 6 sets of competing hypotheses from this debate that I will test with my
data.  Each hypothesis has a neoliberal/modernization theory version (a) and a
dependency/world systems theory version (b).  These are usually one-tailed tests,
although for two there is no expected difference between property forms, and these are
thus two-tailed.   These hypotheses are either direct tests of key mechanisms of either
development or underdevelopment identified by both traditions, or logical outcomes of
the combined effects of the mechanisms identified by one theoretical school or the other.
Hypothesis 1:  Stimulating domestic demand
Hypothesis 1a (modernization):  Foreign firms stimulate domestic demand as much as
domestic private firms because they do not import more of their inputs than domestic
private firms (two-tailed).
 Hypothesis 1b (dependency):  Foreign firms provide less stimulation of demand than
domestic private firms because they  import more of their inputs than domestic private
firms (one-tailed).
 Hypothesis 2:  Profitability
Hypothesis 2a (modernization theory):  Foreign firms will be more profitable than
domestic private firms because of their superior efficiency and dynamism (one-tailed).
Hypothesis 2b (dependency theory):  Foreign firms are less profitable than domestic
private firms because they engage in transfer pricing to not pay their fair share of taxes
(one-tailed).
Hypothesis 3: Increasing Revenue7
Hypothesis 3a (modernization theory):  Foreign firms  increase their revenues more than
domestic private firms  because of their superior efficiency and dynamism and links to
Western markets (one-tailed).
Hypothesis 3b (dependency theory):  Foreign firms do not increase their revenues more
than domestic private firms because they are parasitic on the domestic market (two-
tailed).
Hypothesis 4:   Demand for labor.
Hypothesis 4a (modernization theory):  Foreign owned firms provide more new jobs than
domestic private firms because they are more dynamic and pursue more restructuring than
domestic private firms (one-tailed).
Hypothesis 4b (dependency theory): Foreign owned firms provide fewer new jobs than
domestic private firms because they seek to replace local production by “buying
markets”(one-tailed).
Hypothesis 5: Investment behavior.
Hypothesis 5a (modernization theory):  Foreign owned firms are more likely than
domestic private firms to invest in fixed or variable capital because of their access to
Western capital and technology (one-tailed).
Hypothesis 5b (dependency theory): Foreign owned firms are less likely than domestic
private firms to invest in fixed or variable capital because they seek to use low-wage, low
value added labor or to simply sell commodities produced elsewhere on the local market
(one-tailed).
Hypothesis 6:  Labor productivity8
Hypothesis 6a (modernization theory): Foreign owned firms increase labor productivity
more than domestic private firms through the introduction of new technology, superior
management techniques, and greater economies of scale made possible by exports to
Western Europe (one-tailed).
Hypothesis 6b (dependency theory): Foreign owned firms increase labor productivity less
than domestic owned firms because they seek to use low-wage, low value added labor
(one-tailed).
Prior Research on Foreign Direct Investment
Cross-National Studies
There is a substantial empirical debate on the impact of foreign investment on
economic development that utilizes a large scale cross-national comparative framework.
These authors use aggregate indicators of foreign investment and  economic development
with the country as the unit of analysis – and the results from this research strategy are
mixed and remain hotly contested.  
Much of the research finds that foreign investment has a deleterious impact on
development.  Marsh (1988), Chase-Dunn (1975), and Dixon and Boswell (1996) found a
strong negative association between foreign investment and the rate of growth.  In
contrast, Jackman (1982), Sharma (1986), and Firebaugh (1992, 1996) found that foreign
investment facilitates growth. Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson (1978), Bornschier
(1980), Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), Dolin and Tomlin (1980), and  Kentor
(1998) found  that in the short-term foreign investment stimulates growth but in the long
run it dampens growth. Finally, there are a number of studies which find that foreign9
direct investment does not have any effect on growth (Hein 1992; Dutt 1997). 
There are a number of potential problems with applying the cross-national
aggregate comparison method in post-communist society.  The relatively low levels of
FDI in the post-communist environment, the large number of potential predictor
variables, the small number of post-communist countries (25), and the lack of
independence between the cases, provide a context which makes the cross-national
country comparison approach particularly difficult.  Moreover, it is not clear that these
cross-national studies are cast at the only logically possible level of analysis for studying
this issue more generally.  I pursue a different logic of inquiry on a different level of
analysis.  Instead of correlating aggregate growth levels with aggregate foreign
investment levels for many countries, I compare the performance of foreign owned firms
to domestic owned firms within one country.  Since most of the purported economic
effects of foreign investment take place at the firm level,
3 inferences about the impact of
foreign investment at the firm level from macro-economic data risks succumbing to a
classic ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950).  For those using macro-economic data as the
                                                          
3 There is a whole literature on the negative externalities of foreign investment on income
inequality (Chase Dunn 1975; Bornschier 1980), fertility rates (London 1988),
overurbanization (Timberlake and Kentor 1983), and rebellions (Boswell and Dixon
1990).  These results of could be true, even if foreign firms outperform domestic ones.   If
the magnitude of these negative externalities is great enough, they may override any
positive economic effect created by the higher performance of foreign owned firms.10
outcome variable, the unit of analysis (the enterprise) is not the unit of observation
(country level aggregate statistics).  Thus, at the very least, the cross-national aggregate
statistics research strategy should be confirmed by firm-level studies.
Not all analysts, however, have pursued the macro-comparative strategy, as many
have studied foreign direct investment in particular countries.  Much of this research
involves case studies of a single firm or a small number of firms in various countries,
including many post-communist countries.  These case studies now number in the
hundreds, and while informative they suffer the obvious limitations in generalizing their
findings.  There have also been some quantitative analyses based in single countries.
Typically, this is done with longitudinal data on the aggregate  levels of investment and
growth (or other outcome variables like inequality or quality of life measures) in different
sub-national geographical regions.  For example, Chen, Chang and Zhang (1995) find that
foreign investment in China in the post-1978 reform period leads to both economic
development and increasing income inequality.  Khan (1997) shows that foreign
investment in Vietnam leads an increase in household income and consumption.   Jansen
(1995) finds that foreign direct investment in Thailand had a positive effect on private
investment and growth, but can have adverse balance of payments consequences.
Bradshaw, Kim and London (1993) show with time series data that foreign direct
investment in Korea leads to capital outflow.  This strategy, while less likely to produce
erroneous results than nation wide comparisons, none-the-less still risks committing the
identical ecological fallacy.  Furthermore, no such analyses to my knowledge have been
done on Hungary or Central Europe.11
Firm Comparisons
 The research strategy I am employing in this study of foreign investment has been
employed by analyses that compare the performance of privatized firms with state owned
firms (see Boardman and Vining 1989; Pohl et al. 1997;  Frydman et al. 1997; LaPorta
and Lopez-de-Silanes 1997; Boubakri et al., 1997; Vining and Broadman 1992). There
have also been some studies of the concentration of ownership on firm performance (see
Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl 1999). My study differs from these analyses by focusing on
foreign owned firms compared to domestic private firms.
Measures of Firm Performance
This literature on the performance of privatized enterprises makes it clear that
there are many plausible indicators of firm performance.  When measuring performance,
as with any task of measurement, researchers can only measure various indicators of the
underlying concept of interest (Lazarsfeld 1966).  Because all indicators are imperfect and
might be misleading, the more indicators the better. This is especially true when one is
trying to get at a very complex variable like performance.  For example, most would agree
that high performing firms will make significant investments.  However, if significant
investments are made in a product line with declining demand, these investments would
indicate poor performance.  Thus, there are many potential “false positives” in measures of
performance.  The solution to this dilemma is to use multiple indicators.  If a pattern can be
seen across multiple indicators, one can have great confidence in one’s inferences (Webb et
al. 1981).12
Measurement of firm performance in the Finance literature frequently takes a
measure of the market value of the firm as central to defining its “performance” (e.g. Ofer
and Siegel 1978). This is a reasonable measure if there are deep and effective stock markets
and the concomitant monitoring institutions to facilitate this activity.  Post-communist stock
markets do not come anywhere near Western standards, and thus this measurement of
performance is not valid. The other typical way to measure performance in the sociological
population ecology school is to measure firm survival rates (Hannan and Freeman 1989).
However, not enough time has passed in post-communism and firms have not, generally,
been allowed to go out of business entirely (Mitchell 1998).  Thus, survival rates are also
inapplicable to the post-communist environment.
Fortunately, there are many other possible indicators of performance. The most
obvious is profitability (e.g. Frydman et al 1997; LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1997;
Boubakri et al., 1997; Brada 1998; Djankov amd Claessens 1997; Pohl et al 1997).  Profit
represents the difference between the revenues with the cost of producing them.  This
necessitates a combination of entrepreneurial creativity (making and selling the product)
with discipline (keeping the cost of the commodity down).  Still, profitability, while one
measure of efficiency, is not a perfect measure, especially in the post-communist
environment.  In extensive fieldwork in Central Europe I have come across a good deal of
manipulation of profitability for various purposes usually having to do with reducing
taxes, but also sometimes involving special conditions for obtaining special loans for
cooperatives. Frydman et al (1997) argue that in the transition economies the dramatic13
changes in accounting methods, imperfect disclosure, and short reporting histories, make
this measure even more problematic.
Perhaps a measure of performance that is less subject to manipulation by
accounting methods than profitability is the growth in a firm’s revenues (e.g. Frydman et
al. 1997).  High performing firms should be able to generate a growing amount of
revenues.  Furthermore, for post-communist firms, cost-cutting moves like cutting
redundant labor and socialist era amenities are usually obvious, while generating new
revenues in the face of world competition is far more difficult, and thus plausibly requires
more entrepreneurial activity or creativity.
A similar logic suggests that another important measure of performance is the
likelihood of providing new employment.  In the severe “transformational depressions”
most firms had to shed significant amounts of labor.  However, if Schumpeterian creative
destruction were going on, some of these firms should be employing new labor as
restructuring occurs. This is important, since in almost all firms inherited from the
communist period there was substantial hidden unemployment (a result of labor hoarding
in the shortage economy (Kornai 1980)).  Clearly, the easiest cost-cutting opportunity was
in letting some of these “hidden unemployed” go. Thus, both efficient and inefficient
firms could be expected to reduce their total workforce (Kõrösi 1998). However, the high
performing firms will simultaneously be restructuring – which involves changing14
production techniques, the range of commodities that are produced, and marketing
structures.   All of these activities most likely require hiring new labor.
4
An intuitively important indicator often used to measure performance is
investment (Lízal and Svejnar 1997).  Because of the universally recognized
disadvantages inherited by post-communist economies in terms of a technologically
obsolete industrial structure,  to a large extent the success of the transition to capitalism
will be measured on the post-communist enterprises abilities to carry out expensive
restructuring. Restructuring requires investment. Clearly, if foreign firms have superior
access to loans and other sources of capital and technology, they will be in a position to
make substantial investments.
A final measure of performance, also of great theoretical importance, is labor
productivity (Pohl et al. 1997). This may be the best indicator of firm performance of all –
because only increases in labor productivity allows profits, investment, and real incomes
to simultaneously expand in a virtuous circle that constitutes development (see Brenner
1986; Storper 1998).
While we can identify multiple indicators of firm performance, to use these
indicators as a dependent variable one must confront a potential selection bias.  When
comparing state owned firms to privatized firms it is possible that only the “good” firms
were privatized, leaving the state with the “lemons” (Frydman et al 1997; Djankov and
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provide a social benefit in reducing unemployment and increasing labor market mobility.15
Claessens 1997).  We are not concerned with state ownership in this analysis so this bias
is of no particular consequence.  However, there is a logical possibility of a similar
selection bias in the data set with regards to foreign ownership. Foreigners may have been
able to select from among the firms with the greatest potential – since foreign owned
firms had the largest amount of hard currency among potential owners.  The state,
generally being in need of hard currency, might therefore favor foreigners.  The perfect
data set would have to have some type of data that could control for this bias.  However,
obtaining such data would be very difficult indeed.  Measures that rely on financial data,
like relative efficiency (e.g. Spenner et al 1998), are problematic.  The “prices” upon
which the earlier calculations are made are effectively fictitious – and do not represent
supply and demand pressures.  Minimizing “prices” in late socialism was not a measure
of efficiency, because one didn’t need to cover the cost of production with sales because
of the pervasiveness of soft-budget constraints (Kornai 1980; Frydman, Rapazcynski
1994: 145).
It could also be argued, however, that privatization occurred on such a massive
scale in so short a time that this potential selection bias effect should be substantially
reduced.  For it requires time and manpower to pick the winners from the losers -- and
multinationals may not have had enough time in every instance.   Furthermore, foreign
capital’s proclivity for taking the jewels of the industrial structure should be partially
offset by: 1) the post-communist state elite’s desire to hold onto to some companies they
recently made big investments in for fiscal reasons; 2) political pressure from workers
and domestic managers, as well as various nationalists, to protect domestic firms from16
foreign owners; and 3) foreigner’s limitations on good contacts and good knowledge of
local productive assets and markets.  Still, ideally, one would want to control for this.  I
do this indirectly with the 1997 data through a set of detailed sector control variables.
Data and Measurement
The hypotheses will be tested with two firm-level large random sample surveys
conducted in Hungary in 1996 and 1997.  Hungary is an obvious candidate for the study
of foreign investment in the transition to capitalism because it has the highest levels of
foreign investment per capita in the post-communist world.
5   There should therefore be
many examples of foreign ownership that can be compared to domestically owned firms.
The 1996 data was from a survey written by János István Tóth and András Semjén
and collected from November 2-30 in 1996 by the professional survey organization Tárki,
the leading such institution in the county.  It is a firm level survey of 293 firms sampled
from all firms with more than 50 employees registered in Budapest.  The 1997 survey was
written by Iván Szelényi and Imre Kovacs, and conducted by Sociology doctoral students
under the direction of Kovacs in the winter of 1998.  It randomly samples 580 firms from
the 3000 largest in the country based on revenues.  Both surveys are excellent samples of
Hungary’s medium and large firms.
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twice as much as the next closest county, the Czech Republic’s $726, and approximately
ten times the $153 average for the post-communist world (EBRD 1998: 12).17
Our confidence in the validity of the 1996 data is strengthened by the results from
the 1997 data.  This data set, though generally less valuable than the 1996 data in terms of
the number of firm level variables, is superior in certain respects.  First, the 1997 data
includes retrospective measures from 1993 and 1988 of firm level variables.  The
retrospective data is utilized to construct performance indicators that capture change over
time.  This is superior to the single year of data provided by the 1996 data set.
6 Another
advantage to this data set is that it has superior information about firm activities –
allowing for superior control variables.  I will argue that these variables serve as a rough
control on the attractiveness of the firm, thereby controlling for the possible selection bias
in the data.
Measures of Performance
There are nine different dependent variables employed in the logistic regression
models.  These nine dummy variables are described in Table 1, which also lists their
frequencies in the sample. The first six variables are recorded as dummy variables in the
1996 data set.  The last three variables that use the 1997 data (increase in fixed capital,
increase in labor productivity, and an increase in profits per worker) are turned into
dummies from continuous variables to keep the comparison with the 1996 data set easy to
interpret.
Insert Table 1 about here.
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to be highly correlated with performance in the previous year18
The following equations were used to calculate the measures from the 1997 data set.
Increase in Labor Productivity = Increase in Revenues/ Increase in Number of Employees
per year.
Increase in Fixed Capital = Fixed Capital in 1997 - Fixed Capital in 1993 divided by total
years.
Profitability = Increase in Profits per worker per year.
Measures of Ownership
The 293 cases in the 1996 data set were divided up into three mutually exclusive
and exhaustive categories of ownership.  If a firm had no majority owner with at least
25% of the ownership shares, that ownership pattern was classified as “no dominant
owner.”  If the state had at least 25% and no other category had at least 25%, the firm was
deemed state owned.  If foreign firms or people owned at least 25% of shares, regardless
of other holdings, it was considered foreign owned (thus, all joint ventures were classified
as dominated by foreign capital, even though there may well be a major Hungarian
partner).  If firms had at least 25% domestic private ownership, and no foreign ownership,
they were labeled as private domestic.  If they also had a large state share (i.e. if they were
mixed public-private) they were still treated as domestic private ownership under the
assumption that the new private owners ran things and that the state was a passive owner
that would eventually sell out the rest of its shares.
7    
                                                          
7  Models with more precise ownership categories (i.e. Joint Ventures and Mixed
Ownership) do not add any explanatory power, nor do they effect any of the main19
The measures of ownership in the 1997 data are similar to those used in the first
six models. Firms were mutually exclusive and exhaustively divided up into ownership
categories with at least 25% ownership. Thus there is state property, foreign property,
domestic property, and a new category “other” which includes firms that reported other,
unspecified, types of property.
8  Again, joint ventures were considered foreign owned,
and mixed enterprises were considered domestic private firms.
In some contexts (such as in the advanced West), if we know a firm had 25%
foreign ownership, we would not have much of an idea about how concentrated that
                                                                                                                                                                            
findings.  Joint-ventures behaved like foreign owned firms, and mixed firms behaved like
private domestic firms.
8  This “other” category is treated as though it has no specific ownership content – simply
because we don’t know what the “other” means.  Prior experience with creating a data set
with actual survey with “other” as an ownership category indicates that these firms might
be certain legal forms of employee owned firms (MRP) because technically the
employees do not own the company’s shares, but rather they have shares in a special legal
entity that owns the firm. If the loans are repaid, after a fixed amount of time, ownership
is transferred to individual employees. “Other” also probably included various domestic
institutions which are neither state nor exactly private market entitities. For example, the
association of pharmacists owns a significant amount of pharmecies throughout the
country.  Thus, most of the “other” category is probably some form of non-state domestic
ownership.20
ownership is.  It is possible that the 25% foreign ownership is divided up into 1000
different owners, while a small group of domestic private owners, perhaps with 10% of
the ownership combined, might be the “real” controlling owners.
The alternative strategy for determining what type of ownership is dominant is
choosing the biggest single owner (this is the strategy employed Frydman et al, 1997).
However, this alternative method is still prone to the same false positives (e.g. this
operationalization wouldn’t catch a case where the state was the biggest owner, but five
managers with 10% of the shares were the real owners).  Because “control” is a relational
concept it can only be ascertained on a case by case basis.  The best way to avoid making
errors in defining a firm’s real locus of ownership rights is to conduct in-depth research
on control in each firm in the sample (see Zeitlin 1974).  This would be enormously time
consuming and expensive – and in all likelihood would not change the substantive story
because of the extremely high concentration of ownership in the post-communist
economy.  Fieldwork from Hungary indicates that the biggest owner is typically a very
good indicator of who controls the firm – and most firms are both owned and controlled
by few people or institutions (King, forthcoming).  This work is corroborated by the most
recent survey data in Poland and Hungary, where the average holding of a private party
who is the largest owner is the majority shareholder (Frydman et al 1997:11).
Control Variables
Many things could be causally related to either the ownership variables and/or the
dependent variables in the different models. An obvious candidate is the size of the firm.
The bigger the firm, the more economies of scale it can capture.  We would also expect21
diseconomies of scale at some point, although Hungary, being a very small country,
mostly has undersized firms compared to their international competitors.  Most likely,
economies of scale will start to taper off at some point.  Thus, all the models include a
variable called size, which is the natural log of the number of employees.  This
transformation is appropriate for skewed data like size in which there are a very small
number of very large values.
The second obviously important control variable is the age of the firm.  Normally,
organizational theorists would expect there to be a liability of newness (Stinchcombe
1965; Nelson and Winter 1982; Hannan and Freeman 1989) -- as there are various types
of start-up costs to be born when establishing a business.  On the other hand, one could
plausibly argue that in post-communist society this liability of newness is reversed, and
there is the liability of age.  Old "dinosaurs" from the socialist period are described as
outdated and inherently inefficient in a market environment (see Kozminski 1993). One
would expect that these old socialist firms, even after being privatized, might have
inferior performance for some time. A dichotomous variable of whether the firm was
founded before or after 1990 is another control for age. This should capture the
“dinosaur” effect. Another measure is the firm’s age in years, which should catch any
liability of newness that might be present.
Equally likely to be a confounding variable as age is the firm's relation to sources
of finance (see King 1997, forthcoming). Access to loans might easily explain which
firms can afford to make significant restructuring moves to enhance performance.  One
would expect this variable to be unevenly distributed across types of owners.  Arguably22
state owned firms as well as foreign owned firms have superior access to finance (see
King forthcoming). Thus, this variable is controlled for by a dummy variable of whether
the firm used loans or not. Another variable is a dummy that captures whether firms had
very heavy debt burdens, which one would expect would damage firm performance as
cash that could be used for investment goes out as interest payments (World Bank 1996;
Bogotec 1993; Karsai and Write 1994). This variable captures whether the firm had debts
equal to half or more of its equity.
  Another control that is particularly important in the post-communist context is
rate of taxation.   Post-communist economies have undergone a number of very quick
transformations of tax codes -- and many claim that taxation is neither uniform nor fair.
Furthermore, there is reason to expect that this variable is not evenly distributed among
firms.  For example, foreign firms in Hungary were awarded  tax reductions and holidays
for 5 to 10 years as incentives for investing. Thus, any observed superior performance of
foreign firms might be spurious, with taxation advantages being the real cause.  Taxation
is a continuous variable that measures the percent of revenues that are taxed in the total
tax bill.
An additional fiscal variable similarly important in the post-communist
environment is the continuation of "soft budget constraints" in one form or the other.
This might weaken firm performance because the market doesn't sufficiently "discipline"
the firm (Schleifer and Vishny 1994). On the other hand, soft budget constraints might
provide the financial flexibility necessary for investment and restructuring.  This dummy23
variable indicates that in the past year the firm has been late paying taxes and/or owes
money to the social security fund.
A different potential confounding variable is competition from the advanced
capitalist word, including the Newly Industrialized Countries of Asia.  Arguably,
competition with the major players in the world economic system might be expected to
discipline a firm over time, leading to greater performance.  Conversely, one could argue
that competition with huge, technologically superior multinational producers would lead
to a massive loss of markets and revenues, damaging a firm’s capacity to invest and
restructure (see Matzner 1996). The variable advanced competition indicates the firm had
major competitors based in Western Europe, the U.S., or Asia.
  The last potentially important variable that will be considered in the
regression models using the 1996 data is sector.  In any given year, one might expect the
particularities of the specific markets in specific commodities to be a major predictor of
the firm’s success. Some research also indicates that sector might be important when
measuring the effect of FDI.  Hlavacek (1998) finds that the effects that FDI has on
quality of life indicators varies by sectors.  Jaffee and Stokes (1986) find that  the effect
of foreign investment depends on whether the investment is in extractive industries or
not. The 1996 data set allows for only a broad indicator of sector.  The variables measure
whether the firm does manufacturing and construction (coded “production”), wholesale or
retail trade (coded “trade”), or both (the excluded category in the logistic regression).
In the equations with the 1997 data set identical age and size variables were used.
A new variable indicating whether the firm had been privatized or not was also24
constructed. This is an important potential control variable because some have theorized a
“privatization shock” (see Mertlík 1996) in which the business of preparing privatization
dominates management’s’ time and energy, thereby putting off needed restructuring.
  There are twelve dummy variables to control for sector in the 1997 data set
(chemicals, textiles, construction, trade, engineering, food, financial services, other
services, agriculture/fishing/forestry, transport/communication, education/science/mass
media, education, and army/police).  Each sector with at least 12 firms in it was measured
with a dummy variable.  A residual category lumped together mines, oil, paper/printing,
tourism and hotels, household, and “other industry.”  The suppressed category are all
those additional residual sectors (electricity and public utilities and health and social
services).  This suppressed category is basically the permanent state sector outside of the
military and police.
9
The external validity of the data is supported by a comparison of the types of
ownership between the two surveys (see Table 2).  A third statistic provided by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is their estimate of the percent of
the Gross Domestic Product originating in the “private” sector.  This further bolsters our
confidence in the validity of these two surveys.
Insert table 2 about here.
                                                          
9  Of course, some of the utilities was privatized with foreign capital – so this sector isn’t
completely state owned.  However, even these utilities are still natural monopolies and
they are still highly regulated.25
 Models and Methods
Logistic Regression techniques are used because the dependent variables in the
models using the 1996 data consist of categorical variables.   Table 3 and 4 report odd-
ratios.   These are exponentiated coefficients from the equations.  They  represent the
likelihood of  an independent variable covarying with the dependent variable compared to
the excluded category.  Thus an odds ratio of 1.5 for foreign investment means that a firm
with foreign investment is 1.5 times as likely as firms with the excluded ownership
category (domestic ownership) to have a positive value on the dependent variables. Odds
ratios below 1 mean the independent variable is less likely than the excluded variable to
covary with the dependent variable ( e.g. 0.5 means it is half as likely as the excluded
variable to covary with the dependent variable). In all models the excluded ownership
variable is domestic private ownership.
The basic equation for the six models using the 1996 data is:
Y = a + ß1 (Nodom) + ß2 (Statedom) + ß3 (Fordom) + ß4 (Production) + ß5
(Trade) + ß6 (Size) + ß7 (Pre1990) + ß8 (Firmage) + ß9 (Baddebt) + ß10 (Loans) + ß11
(Softbudget) + ß12 (Taxes) + ß13 (Advancedcomp)  + ε.
Where Y = the log odds of a firm being a high performer in 1996.  All six models are the
same except for the dependent variable (performance).  Table 3 reports the odds ratios for
foreign investment and the control variables for the six dependent variables from the
1996 data. Appendix A provides ßs and standard errors for all of the variables as well as
goodness of fit and chi-squares for all the models.26
Insert Table 3 about here.
Results
 As can be seen, foreign ownership is the most consistently important determinant
of firm performance after controlling for a number of variables.  Compared to domestic
private ownership, foreign owned firms are more than two times as likely to have
increased their revenues, more than twice as likely to employ new laborers, almost two
times as likely to have invested in fixed capital, and more than two times as likely to have
invested at least 10,000,000 HUF (about $45,000) in 1996. These findings across four of
the five direct indicators of performance makes it fairly clear that firms with dominant
foreign ownership perform better than domestic owned firms, as neoliberals and
modernization theorists insist.
This consistent performance across four indicators makes the strong result that
foreign owned firms are less than a third as likely than domestic owned firms to be
profitable all the more surprising.  Profitability, after all, is traditionally held out as the
best indicator of firm performance.  Dependency and world systems advocates would
argue that lower levels of profitability is probably the result of transfer pricing profits out
of Hungary to minimize the multinational tax bill.  On the other hand, many foreign
owned firms received tax breaks or even tax holidays in the first 5 to 10 years of
operation.  As a result, they may have had an incentive to "transfer price" profits into
Hungary during this period.
 What seems most likely, given the superiority of foreign27
firms on the other indicators, is that that domestic owned firms are able to have superior
profitability without as much investment or restructuring.
This could occur for a number of reasons.  It might be because they have special
information about niche markets (although this is at least partially controlled for with the
variable "advanced competition").  It is also possible that superior knowledge of the local
economic landscape allows them to restructure in ways that require less monetary
investment than foreign firms.  They may recognize new opportunities and be able to
innovate much as they did under the shortage economy  -- perhaps they are natural
"flexible specializers" because of this inherited skill. If this were the case to a significant
extent, however, we would expect domestic owned firms to perform more favorably than
they do when compared to foreign owned firms on increasing their revenues.  It is
perhaps more likely that domestically owned firms are better able to exploit network ties
forged in the socialist period.  For example, they might use these connects to
disproportionately receive state contracts which allow for a high rate of profit (See Stark
1990, 1992, 1996 and Stark and Bruszt 1995 for a discussion of the continuing
importance of network ties formed in the socialist period in the post-socialist
environment).  Alternatively, it could be that the foreign owned firms enjoy such an
advantage in terms of market access and investment capital that they are not as concerned
with economizing as much as domestic firms.  Rather, they may be focussing their
activities on the growth of market share.  Finally, it is also possible that profitability
simply doesn't have as great validity as these other indicators of performance.28
Profitability can be manipulated, but most domestic firms would have an incentive to
manipulate profits down, to minimize taxes.
In spite of the low levels of profitability, the other indicators consistently rate
foreign owned firms as the star performers of the post-communist economy.  However,
the story is even more favorable to the modernizationist vision when one considers the
lack of significance for the different likelihood of importing a high percentage of inputs
between the property forms.  Those in the dependency and world systems schools insist
that foreign ownership leads to underdevelopment by importing what was previously
domestically produced intermediary goods. This should damage both the balance of trade,
and destroy domestic demand and jobs. In Peter Evan’s famous analysis of development
in Brazil, the importing of inputs by multinational corporations had a disastrous impact
on the economy (Evans 1979).  However, while foreign owned firms were almost twice
as likely than domestic firms to have more than half of the firm’s inputs originate from
external sources, this difference did not even approach being statistically significant.
While ownership was clearly the most important variable overall, some of the
control variables were also important.  As expected, size seems to matter a great deal.
The larger the firm, the more likely the firm is to make investments and to hire new
employees.  Let us take a domestically owned firm, of the median age (four years) with
the median tax rate (25%) with advanced capitalist competitors, loans, no bad debt and no
soft-budget constraints, as an example.  The likelihood of making an investment of at
least 10,000,000 HUF for such firms in the 25
th percentile (73 employees) is 43.55%,
firms in the 50
th percentile (120 employees) is 55.23%, and firms in the 75
th percentile29
(240 employees) is 71.17%.  Thus, we see a clear pattern of accelerating economies of
scale.
Another important variable was sector.  Firms that only produced or traded
performed significantly worse than firms that did both activities. This might reflect the
institutional uncertainty of the post-communist economies -- where firms that can both do
marketing and production may be able to respond flexibly to this uncertainty and thus
have superior performance.  Interestingly, with the exception of a slight negative effect of
firm age on increasing firm revenues, the age of the firm does not have an effect on
performance, undermining with the notion of the under-performing “dinosaur.” These
results were confirmed in the analysis performed with the 1997 data.
The Model
The basic model for the equations using the 1997 data is:
Y = a + ß1 (Nodom) + ß2 (Statedom) + ß3 (Fordom) +  ß4 (Other) + ß5 (Size) + ß6
(Chemicals) + ß7 (Textiles) + ß8 (Construction) + ß9 (Trade) + ß10 (Engineering) + ß11
(Food) + ß12 (FinancialServices) + ß13 (OtherServices) + ß14 (Agriculture) + ß15
(Trasport/Communication) + ß16 (Education) +  ß17 (Army/Police) +  ß18 (Privatized) +
ß19 (Pre1990) + ß20 (Age) + ε.
There are three different dependent variables: increases in profits per worker,
increases in labor productivity, and increases in fixed capital. Table 4 reports odds ratios
and control variables for two of these variables.
Insert Table 4 around here.30
What is clear is that foreign investment is still an excellent predictor of firm
performance – even when one controls for sector more fully than in the first six models.
Foreign owned firms are almost twice as likely as domestic owned firms to be above
average in increasing labor productivity.  They are also more than 1.5 times as likely than
domestic owned firms to have increased their fixed capital investments more than
average. This finding also speaks to the potential selection bias discussed above through
the use of the detailed sector variables.  Some firms were modernized by the Communist
regime prior to the revolution – and these might be more attractive to foreign capital.
However, this type of investment usually went to entire sectors which were typically
monopolistic.  An example of this is the pharmaceutical industry, which had been the
flagship industry in late socialism in Hungary and thus received major investment funds
from the state in the late socialist period.  Much of this sector was privatized by French
Multinationals.  Controlling for sector is therefore at least an approximate control for
possible sample selection bias. Indeed, firms in the chemical sector are nearly 10 times as
likely as the excluded sectors to have increased labor productivity more than average.
Thus, if sector captures “firm potential” – foreign owned firms still have superior
performance beyond any selection bias. Finally, the control for privatization is
statistically significant for increasing fixed capital less than average – confirming the
“privatization shock” hypothesis.
Notably, the contrary finding on profitability from the 1996 data was not
supported using the 1997 data (model not shown).  In this sample of larger firms, foreign
owned firms are not less profitable than domestically owned firms.  Thus, this supports31
neither the neoliberal/modernization hypothesis nor the dependency/world systems
hypothesis on profitability.  Perhaps the various purported effects cancel each other out. It
could also be that the negative effect of foreign ownership and profitability holds only for
1996 and 1997, and not over the period 1993-1997.  Possibly, tax holidays that had been
granted to some investors might have run their course, thereby prompting firms to begin
transferring profits to other tax havens located in the multinational empire.
Discussion and Conclusion
If we return to the initial six competing hypotheses, we see that the evidence
strongly supports the neoliberal/modernizationist position.  Foreign ownership did not
provide less stimulation to domestic producers of inputs than domestically owned firms
(or the effect was not statistically significant).  Foreign owned firms were able to
disproportionately increase their revenues, hire new labor, invest in fixed and variable
capital, and increase labor productivity.  The only neoliberal/modernizationist hypothesis
that is not supported is that foreign owned firms are more profitable than domestic firms.
In one of the regression models, using the 1996 data set, the dependency/world systems
theory position that foreign owned firms would be less profitable than domestic firms is
supported.  However, this finding was not repeated in the regression model using the1997
data that had a full set of sector variables.
Taken together, these findings strongly support the modernization theory
neoclassical position. These findings should be more reliable than the cross-national
aggregate studies. The superior methodology of this study compared to most others lies in
the use of firm-level data (thus eliminating possible ecological errors), the use of multiple32
measures of firm performance, and the large number of control variables, including
detailed sector variables.   Measurements of firm performance can be tricky – and in
general our confidence increases with the number of independent measures we have of a
phenomenon.  This paper used nine different measures of firm performance.  The
consistent pattern across seven of these nine indicators strongly suggests that foreign
ownership contributes to developing dynamic firms – and thus positively contributes to a
successful transition from socialism to capitalism.
These findings are consistent with the cross-national studies that conclude that
foreign investment is positively related to growth.  They are also, however, potentially
still consistent with the various interpretations which see foreign investment as being
negatively associated with economic development in the long run.  Foreign owned firms
may export large amounts of capital out of the country through profit repatriation, and
they may become new monopolists.  This possibility of a growing monopolization of the
economy combined with a repatriation of profits may well be a recipe for stagnation in
the future.  We need longitudinal firm level data on these two mechanisms as a next
logical step in research on this vital question.  While foreign ownership theoretically
might still damage the economy in the long-run, based on the data that is in, foreign
ownership seems to have had a large positive effect on the Hungarian economy. What is
clear is that foreign owned firms had far superior ability to access to investment capital,
and had the ability to increase their revenues through exports.
This need for investment must be analyzed in a historical context. First, Eastern
Europe received no Marshall plan to stimulate investment as Western Europe was granted33
after World War Two (nor the spillovers from great levels of defense expenditures
associated with the rearmament during the Cold War). Many sectors in these post-
communist countries need massive amounts of new investments to be internationally
competitive.  But investment capital is extremely scarce in the post-communist
environment, where domestic bank loans are usually prohibitively expensive (King,
forthcoming).  Foreign investment may be the best source of such capital.  Second, the
importance of gaining access to Western European markets can not be underestimated.
All cases of successful “catching-up” in the post-World War Two period have relied on
this process.  Germany and Japan modernized their economies during the 1950s and
1960s by capturing an increasing share of the U.S. market, much as South Korea and
Taiwan were able to capture export markets in the 1970s and 1980s, and now the Chinese
in the 1990s (see Brenner 1998).
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Table 1: Measures of Performance and Descriptive
Variable What it measures   % of Sample
Foreign Inputs More than 50% of inputs     13.3% 
(1996 Data) from foreign sources in
1996
Profitability The firm was profitable               64.5%
(1996 Data) in 1996
Increase The firm was profitable       65.5%
(1997 Data) from 1993-1997
Increase Revenue The firm increased its         38.6%
(1996 Data) revenue in 1996 compared
to 1995
New Employees The firm hired new           29.4%
(1996 Data) employees in 1996
Invest in Fixed Cap.    The firm increased its                   43.7%
(1996ata) fixed capital in 1996
Big Investment The firm invested at                   51.2%
(1996 Data) least 10,000,000 HUF
in 1996
Increase in Fixed The firm increased its                  50.0%
Capital fixed capital more than
(1997Data) average from 1993-1997 
Increase in Labor  The firm increased its                  50.0%
Productivity  labor productivity more
(1997Data) than average from 1993-
199753
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables
1996 Data  1997 Data  EBRD estimate
of GDP from private
Sector 1996/1997.
Ownership Category
No dominant 5.80%   3.40%                      
State 12.63% 14.80%
Foreign 22.87% 28.90%
Domestic 58.70% 46.90%
Other   6.00%
Total Private 77.13%   71.1%   70%
Control Variables
Pre1990 15.70% 22.51%
Loans 49.83%
Big Debt 8.87%
AdvComp 52.00%
Soft. Bud. 40.61%
Production 18.40%
Trade 20.6%
Production 61.0%
and Trade
Privatized 34.19%
Chemical 3.44%
Textile 3.44%54
Construction 9.26%
Trade 23.20%
Engineering 8.25%
Food 5.15%
Transport 5.33%
Agriculture 3.95%
Army 4.81%
Education 3.95%
Tourism 2.41%
Financial Services 5.33%
Other Services 9.79%
Other Sectors 5.33%
Means, Medians & Standard Deviations
       Mean    Median    St. Dev.
Employees in 1996    233.24   120    380.31
Employees in 1997   519.47    100     3840.04
Firm Age in 1996       7.17      4     10.65
Firm Age in 1997        6.74     3      9.28
Taxation Rate     26.14   25           17.6655
Table 3: Odds Ratios for Foreign Investment (relative to domestic private
ownership) and Control Variables on Six Models
Model 1
Foreign
Inputs
 Model 2
Profitable
Model 3
Increase
Revenue
Model 4
New
Employees
Model 5
Invest in
Fixed Cap.
Model 6
Big
Investment
FDI 1.818 .290*** 2.340** 2.11** 1.819* 2.140*
Production 1.230 .567 .440
† .847 1.190 .923
Trade 1.741 .678 .471
† .250
†† .686 .979
Size 1.421 1.277 1.033 1.483** 1.280** 2.677***
Old Firm 1.493 2.110 3.307 .866 .612 .683
Firm Age .998 .992 .956
† .984 1.017 .973
Large Debt .783 .521 1.281 .657 1.030 .973
Loans .829 1.371 1.363 .984 1.630* 2.092**
Soft Budgt 3.729 .078
†† 1.301 3.933 .461 .441
Taxes(1%) .268 .280 .717 1.203 1.156 .5638
Adv Comp 2.103
† 1.373 1.390 2.361
†† 1.299 .771
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)
Table 4:  Odds Ratios for Foreign Ownership and Controls under models 7 and 8.56
Increase Labor Increase Fixed
Productivity > Avg. Capital > Avg.
FORDOM        1.987**  1.549*
SIZE           .716  1.806
CHEM          8.25
†† 1.723
TEXTILE       1.636
† 1.723
CONSTR        2.117  1.341
TRADE     1.671      2.764
ENGIN         1.207   1.213
FOOD          2.675      1.639
TRANS         1.123      5.456
††
AGR           1.359      1.940
ARMY           .625          11.429
††
EDUC          1.743 3.956
TOURISM        .347 1.881
FINSERV       2.245 4.869
†
OTHSERV       2.129 3.428
†
OTHSEC        1.177 2.806
PRIVATIZ       .762  .426
††
PRE1990        .938  .624
AGE            .995  .996
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)57
Appendix 1:  ßs, S.E.s, and Odds Ratios of all models
Model 1: Dependent Variable = more than 50% of inputs are
from non-Hungarian source.
Log Likelihood    176.754
Goodness of Fit   243.946
Pseudo R
2              .038
Chi-Square     df
9.588 13
Variable      B         S.E.      Exp(B)
Ownership
No dominant  .030      .867       .971
State       -.263      .558      1.301
Foreign     -.461      .492      1.585
Controls
Production   .145      .609       .865
Trade       -.316      .521      1.371
Size         .283      .232      1.327
Pre-1990    -.515      .681      1.674
Age    .003      .024      1.003
Bad Debt     .431      .813       .650
Loans        .329      .436       .720
Soft Budget  .049      .435       .952
Tax Rate    -.009      .012      1.009
Advanced     .577      .425       .562
 Competition
Constant   -2.444     2.288
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)58
Model 2:  Dependent Variable = profitability
 Log Likelihood      260.043
 Goodness of Fit     233.072
 Pseudo R
2              .245
Chi-Square    df 
47.282
†††           13
Variable       B        S.E.    Exp(B)
Ownership
No dominant -.7848     .6718    .456
State       -.1261     .4480    .882
Foreign    -1.1719**    .4049    .273
Controls
Production  -.8278*     .4131    .431
Trade       -.5887     .4324    .555
Size         .2675     .2090   1.307
Pre 1990     .5125     .6337   1.670
Age   -.0165     .0220    .984
Bad debt    -.6382     .5249    .528
Loans       -.0909     .3502    .913
Softbudget-1 .7635
†††    .3436    .171
constraints
Taxrate      .0168     .0505    .983
Advanced     .0532     .3152   1.055
competition
Constant   -3.9532
†    1.9196
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)59
Model 3: Dependent Variable = Growth of Revenue
Log Likelihood      294.215
Goodness of Fit     255.028
Pseudo R
2                       .152
Chi-Square    df 
28.887
††       13
Variable        B        S.E.    Exp(B)
No dominant  -.600      .600     .549
State         .218      .408    1.244
Foreign      1.007**      .414    2.736
Controls
Production   -.750
†     .386     .472
Trade        -.569      .379     .566
Size          .057      .193    1.058
Pre 1999     .543
†         .768    4.678
Age          -.048
†         .023     .953
Bad Debt      .290      .552    1.336
Loans         .222      .317    1.249
Softbudget    .155      .302    1.168
constraints
Taxrate      -.006      .008     .994
Advanced      .296      .293    1.345
competition
Constant     2.0630    1.865
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)60
Model 4: Dependent Variable = Employs New Labor
Log Likelihood      258.282
Goodness of Fit     245.796
Pseudo R
2              .175
Chi-Square    df 
31.774
††       13
Variable     B         S.E.   Exp(B)
No dominant-.849      .8218   .428
State      -.270      .4548   .764
Foreign     .665*     .3747  1.944
Controls
Production -.220      .4391    .803
Trade     -1.049
†     .5027    .350
Size        .400
†     .1912   1.491
Pre 1990    .072      .5674   1.075
Age        -.015      .0219    .985
Bad Debt   -.258      .5192    .773
Loans       .178      .3444   1.195
Softbudget  .306      .3321   1.358
constraints
Taxrate    -.006   .0095  .995
Advanced    .885      .3215   2.424
competition
Constant   -3.8791
†    1.8992
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)61
Model 5: Dependent Variable = Growth of Fixed Capital
Log Likelihood      316.889
Goodness of Fit     243.982
Pseudo R
2                       .117
Chi-Square    df 
22.512
†        13
Variable     B         S.E.     Exp(B)
No dominant -1.043      .705      .349
State         .162      .388     1.174
Foreign       .668*      .349     1.951
Production    .177      .380     1.194
Trade        -.593      .382      .552
Size          .212      .175     1.236
Pre 1990     -.448      .528      .639
Age           .011      .019     1.011
Bad debt     -.050      .484      .952
Loans         .359      .300     1.432
Softbudget   -.659
†         .293      .517
constraints
Taxrate      -.003      .008      .997
Advanced      .153      .278     1.166
competition
Constant    -2.459     1.675
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)62
Model 6: Dependent Variable = Invested at least 10,000,000 HUF
last year
Log Likelihood      264.194
Goodness of Fit     236.151
Pseudo R
2                      .357
Chi-Square    df
76.688
†††      13
Variable     B        S.E.    Exp(B)
No dominant  -1.025      .770    .349
State         -.459      .442      .632
Foreign        .949**      .402     2.583
Controls
Production     .054      .429     1.056
Trade        - .100      .415      .905
Size           .945
†††    .228      2.572
Pre 1990      -.441      .574       .644
Age           -.021      .022       .979
Bad debt       .030      .551      1.021
Loans          .705
†      .337      2.025
Softbudget   -1.180
†††    .333       .307
constraints
Taxrate      -.021*      .009       .980
Advanced     -.245       .316       .783
competition
Constant    -5.376
††     1.938
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)63
Model 7: Dependent Variable is increase labor productivity
more than average.
Log Likelihood        507.136
Goodness of Fit        418.866
Pseudo R
2            .202
Chi-Square    df 
68.174
†††      22
Variable                     B             S.E.        Exp(B)
Ownership
No dominant            .2627           .686             1 .300
State                         - .5992              .401            .549
Foreign                      .6866**           .254              1.987
Other dominant         -.3002             .712            .741
Controls
Size                           .330
†††         .097         .719
Chemical                   2.076
††              .785               7.974
Textile                .468             .716               1.596
Construction            .757             .603              2.132
Trade                   .503             .558              1.654
Engineering         .067             .609              1.068
Food                         1.066            .711              2.902
Transport                .100           .676              1.106
Agriculture                 .372          .705              1.450
Army/police              -.469          .795              .625
Education                 .535            .738              1.708
Tourism                    - .872              1.221            .418
Financial services    .847           .755              2.333
Other services         .684          .616              1.982
Other sectors           .035          .749              1.036
Privatized                  -.299         .272              .742
Pre 1990                   - .167          .310              .846
Age                           -.002         .014              .998
Constant                   7.142             6.967
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)64
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)
Model 8: Changed Fixed Capital more than average
Log Likelihood      491.549
Goodness of Fit      407.492
Pseudo R
2          .183
Chi-Square        df
58.747
†††           22
Variable                    B          S.E.    Exp(B)
Ownership
No dominant       .338  .823               1.402
State                        -1.136**     .410                 .321
Foreign          .473*      .261               1.605
Other dominant   .568      .668                 .567
Size                       .449
†††    .100               1.566
Chemicals            .609      .720               1.838
Textiles           .570      .783               1.767
Construction         .297      .606               1.346
Trade                .985      .554               2.679
Engineering           .205      .594               1.228
Food                  .437      .731               1.548
Transportation          1.721
††      .688                5.593
Agriculture          .635      .695                1.888
Army/police              2.426
††      .826              11.310
Education                  1.393      .740                4.026
Tourism            .592      .824                1.807
Finance services        1.580
†     .725                4.857
Other services           1.264      .623                3.540
Other sectors             1.024      .732                2.784
Privatized                  -.8347      .287          .434
Pre 1990                   - .4397      .328
Age                          -.0033      .014          .997
Constant                   9.667               6.785          .154
* p <= .05 (one-tailed) 
†  p <= .05  (two-tailed)
** p <= .01(one-tailed)
 ††    p <= .01 (two-tailed)65
*** p <= .001 (one-tailed)
††† p<= .001(two-tailed)